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We illuminate the relationship between optimal firm pricing and optimal trade policy by exploring
a generalized model that accommodates product differentiation at both the national and sub-national
(firm) levels.  We assume monopolistic competition in the differentiated products at the sub-national
level.  When the national and sub-national substitution elasticities are similar we find little opportunity
for small countries to improve their terms of trade through trade distortions, because firms play an
important preemptive role in optimally pricing unique varieties.  We contrast this with standard applications
of perfect-competition Armington models, which exhibit high optimal tariffs--even for relatively small
countries.
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A common feature in many trade-policy applications is the Armington (1969) assumption of
national product di®erentiation. Brown (1987) critiques these applications, questioning the
validity of simulated liberalizations that result in very large adverse terms-of-trade e®ects for
relatively small countries. We expand this critique by noting that at the calibration stage of
formulating most Armington models sub-national (¯rm-level) product di®erentiation is not
considered. The resulting marginal-cost pricing at the sub-national level implicitly allocates
market power over unique varieties away from optimizing ¯rms and toward the whim of
the policy authority. Although pervasive in applications, this allocation of market power to
countries rather than ¯rms is a troubling departure from traditional tenets.
This study contributes to the policy simulation literature in two important ways. First,
we use a generalized model of nested di®erentiation to illustrate the mutual consistency be-
tween traditional models of national di®erentiation and the large-group monopolistic com-
petition models popular in new trade theory. Second, we identify a tension in calibration
assumptions between ¯rm-level market power and national-level international-policy lever-
age. Market power is conceptually observable, and is show to be an important consideration
in applied welfare analysis. Assuming optimal ¯rm-level pricing over a country's varieties
can signi¯cantly reduce the implied optimal tari®.
In the past researchers have responded (at least in part) to the Brown (1987) critique
of the Armington formulation by either modifying parametric assumptions, or by modifying
structural assumptions. For example, McDaniel and Balistreri (2003) highlight the general
view that estimated Armington elasticities are too low, and that practitioners favor higher
elasticities, which imply lower optimal tari®s. Others [e.g., Brown et al. (1992)] adopt a
monopolistically-competitive structure that includes ¯rm-level di®erentiation and industry-
wide scale e®ects. The approach adopted here is to develop a model that maintains the
1possibility of both types of di®erentiation (national and sub-national). We show that the
Armington and monopolistic competition structures impose speci¯c parametric restrictions
on our generalized model.1 We thus shift the focus away from alternative structures and
toward potentially measurable parameters.
Our application of the generalized model contributes to the policy debate on both the
theoretic and applied fronts. We show in a stylized theoretic model that increasing the degree
of ¯rm di®erentiation, relative to national di®erentiation, acts to reduce the optimal tari®.
The optimal tari® remains positive when the degree of ¯rm di®erentiation is less than the
degree of national di®erentiation.2 Positive optimal tari®s under monopolistic competition
are broadly consistent with the theoretic work of Flam and Helpman (1987) and Helpman
and Krugman (1989). Tari®s improve a country's terms of trade regardless of whether
di®erentiation is at the ¯rm or at the national level, and the terms-of-trade e®ects of tari®s
intensify when the degree of national di®erentiation is higher relative to the degree of ¯rm
di®erentiation.
We also show, however, that negative optimal tari®s are possible when the degree of
¯rm-level di®erentiation is higher than the level of national di®erentiation.3 This result
is dependent on our assumption that ¯rm markups are based on direct competition with
their domestic rivals. Although natural when ¯rm-level di®erentiation is lower than national
di®erentiation, this assumption is more tenuous when domestic varieties are more closely
related to foreign varieties (relative to other domestic varieties). For example, it is natural to
think of a California winery competing more closely with other California wineries. California
1In fact, the model is also general enough to accommodate the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek formulation. In
this case we would set the ¯rm-level and national-level elasticities of substitution to in¯nity.
2The relevant measure of the level of di®erentiation between products is the inverse of the elasticity of
substitution.
3Markusen (1990) also ¯nds that optimal tari®s might be negative when the degree of domestic di®er-
entiation in a monopolistic-competitive industry is low. That model is somewhat di®erent from the one
employed here, however, because it characterizes the role of specialized inputs in a given industry and treats
all other goods as a homogeneous traded good.
2wineries will largely base their markup on proximity, in product space, to other California
wines.
On the other hand, consider the production of aircraft. It is probably more reasonable
to suppose that Boeing products and Airbus products are less di®erentiated than Boeing
products and Lockheed Martin products (given that Lockheed Martin does not currently
produce commercial aircraft). The assumption that Boeing would markup its product based
on its degree of di®erentiation from Lockheed-Martin is logically problematic. For this reason
we place a caveat on our negative optimal tari® results. From an empirical perspective, once
we move to a model with multiple dimensions, commodities should probably be de¯ned in
a way that eliminates the oddity of more domestic di®erentiation relative to international
di®erentiation within a given industry. For example, (Boeing) airliners should be considered
a di®erent good than military airplanes and aerospace components (produced by Lockheed-
Martin). As with almost any empirical exercise, aggregation is not innocuous in the context
of assuming markups based on the degree of domestic competition.
Another interesting result that falls out of our stylized theoretic model is that, in the
presence of ¯rm-di®erentiation, the optimal tari® increases as the overall degree of preference
bias toward home varieties increases. This is important from the perspective of analyzing
how di®erent sets of calibration assumptions alter the policy implications. There is a great
deal of missing trade in our actual observation of the trade equilibrium.4 In contrast to most
theoretic models and econometric applications, simulation models accommodate missing
trade via a preference bias toward home varieties.5 This bias has an e®ect on the optimal
tari® under ¯rm-level di®erentiation because it alters the relative impacts of variety changes
(number of foreign versus domestic varieties) on welfare. This is an important consideration
4Tre°er (1995) identi¯es missing trade relative to what one would expect from the theory.
5Hillberry et al. (2005) critique the over reliance calibrated models place on preference distribution pa-
rameters, and Balistreri and Hillberry (2004) illustrate the importance of home bias in a welfare analysis of
the US-Canada border e®ect in a calibrated gravity-model application.
3in any policy simulation model that includes a love-of-variety formulation and calibrated
preferences over regional aggregates.
On the applied front we examine the implications, and sensitivity, of our generalized
demand system in a model calibrated to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) social
accounts [Dimaranan and McDougall (2005)]. We examine the optimal tari® relative to
global free trade for small and large countries. We generally ¯nd that optimal pricing by
¯rms producing di®erentiated sub-national products acts to reduce the implied optimal tari®.
We also use the model to simulate the recent U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement under
alternative assumptions about ¯rm di®erentiation. We contrast our results with other studies
that examine the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement.
2 Generalized Demand System
Figure 1 illustrates a generalized demand system for aggregating products di®erentiated at
both the ¯rm and national levels. Within each country or region (indexed by r 2 R) traded
goods are produced by monopolistic competitive ¯rms. The composite traded good, Qr, is a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the Nr individual ¯rm-speci¯c varieties, qr. Although the varieties
produced are di®erent, we assume symmetry across the ¯rms. Algebraically we can represent








Throughout our analysis we adopt some simplifying assumptions about the nature of the Qr
that are common in the literature. We assume each of the Nr ¯rms is small and faces an
integrated world market. This indicates a simple markup over marginal cost equal to the
inverse of the elasticity of substitution between ¯rm varieties, 1=¾f. Integrated markets imply
4Figure 1: Nested Demand System
independence between the markup and the region in which the ¯rm's output is ultimately
consumed.
The parameter ¾f can take on any value greater than one. The degree of ¯rm-level
di®erentiation falls as ¾f increases. When ¾f takes on a value of in¯nity then markups are
zero and we have the special case of perfect competition.6 Notice that (1) simply becomes
the sum of the qr at ¾f equals in¯nity (®f approaches one as ¾f approaches in¯nity). When
¾f is ¯nite the free-entry assumption indicates adjustments in the number of varieties such
that operating pro¯ts exactly cover ¯xed cost payments. We also assume that all costs
6We utilize GAMS software, which accommodates assigned parameter values of +inf. In compilation
GAMS automatically assigns the limits 1=+inf = 0 and (+inf¡1)=+inf = 1. So if we have ¾f = +inf then
®f takes on a value of 1 when the program is compiled.
5(marginal and ¯xed) associated with production use inputs in the same proportion. The
constant-markup formulation indicates constant ¯rm-level output and thus no ¯rm-scale
e®ects. Changes in industry output are in the form of entry or exit of symmetric varieties.
The love of variety nature of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, however, does indicate industry-
level scale e®ects. For a general discussion (and critique) of these implications of the large-
group monopolistic-competition assumptions see Markusen (2002), Chapter 6.
At the national level, the demand system in a given region, r, is composed of a CES ag-





























The substitution elasticity between imported varieties is indicated by ¾n, and the substitution
elasticity between the imported composite and the domestic composite is indicated by ¾dm.














It is relatively straightforward to accommodate the predominant policy-simulation models
within the general demand system outlined in Figure 1. The special case of a simple constant-
returns Armington formulation is accommodated by setting ¾f equal to in¯nity (marginal-
cost pricing by ¯rms) and ¾n equal to ¾dm. Contemporary applications tend to adopt the
more complex case where ¾dm is some fraction|usually one half|of ¾n.7
7For example, the default elasticities used in the widely applied Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
model employ the \rule of two," which assumes ¾n = 2¾dm [Hu® et al. (1997)]. We do not intend to
advocate, or perpetuate, the use of this arbitrary rule. We allow for it in our generalized system because
of its prevalence in application. That said, Liu et al. (2002) fail to reject the \rule of two" as a maintained
hypothesis.
6Another special case often adopted in the policy simulation literature is the Dixit-Stiglitz
formulation of ¯rm-level di®erentiation. Setting ¾f equal to ¾n equal to ¾dm collapses the
system such that only ¯rm-level varieties are relevant. Thus by adjusting the elasticities
in relation to one another we can explore di®erent assumptions about the general nature of
product di®erentiation at the ¯rm and national levels. The demand system has the advantage
of accommodating (parametrically) a wide variety of favored structures that are relevant in
the policy forum.
3 Illustrative General-Equilibrium Simulation Model
The strategy for incorporating the generalized demand system in a relatively transparent
simulation environment involves formulating a stylized theoretic model. The general equilib-
rium is formulated as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP), which is computed using
GAMS software.8 Following Rutherford (1999) the general equilibrium includes three sets
of variables which are associated with three corresponding sets of conditions:
1. transformation activities, which generate outputs or utility, are associated with an
optimality condition given the technologies;
2. prices of inputs, outputs, and composite varieties are associated with market clear-
ance conditions; and
3. nominal income levels for each agent are associated with income balance|between
the value of endowments and the value of demand.
The GAMS code for the algebraic formulation of the nonlinear MCP is presented in Appendix
A. A tabular GAMS/MPSGE formulation is also available from the authors. This section is
divided into two subsections. The ¯rst introduces the algebraic formulation, and the second
presents the experimental controls.
8GAMS Development Corporation: http://www.gams.com.
7Table 1: Scope of the Stylized Theoretic Model
Equilibrium Condition (equation) Associated Variable Dimensions
1)Optimality
Unit-expenditure function = True cost-of-living index (5) Wr(Hicksian welfare index) R
Unit-cost of Ar = The composite price index, P Ar (6) Ar(Armington activity) R
Unit-cost of Qr = the Dixit-Stiglitz price index Pr (7) Qr(Dixit-Stiglitz Aggregate) R
Marginal cost = Marginal revenue (8) qr(Firm output index) R
Pro¯ts = 0 (9) Nr(Number of ¯rms index) R
2)Market-Clearance
Labor endowment = Demand leisure + Demand for labor (10) PLr(Wage index) R
Supply of qr = Demand for qr in Qr (11) pr(Price of ¯rm-level output) R
Supply of Qr = Domestic demand + Export demand (12) Pr(Dixit-Stiglitz price index) R
Supply of Ar = Demand for Ar in Wr (13) P Ar(Armington price index) R
Nominal value of welfare (Wr _ PWr) = Nominal Expenditures (14) PWr(True cost-of-living index) R
3)Income balance
Nominal expenditure = Value of endowment + Tari® revenue (15) RAr(Nominal income) R
Total Dimensions 11R
3.1 Algebraic formulation
The model incorporates many features designed to indicate how applied general equilibrium
models might react, but also abstracts from many complications that might obscure the
key e®ects. The model includes multiple regions/countries (indexed by r) that trade on
integrated world markets. This allows us to examine experiments that vary the relative size
of a region and discriminatory trade policies. Other than country size, all other aspects
of each region's technology and preferences are assumed to be identical. Furthermore, we
assume that each region is endowed with only one factor of production, labor (Lr), which
might be allocated to production or used directly as an input to welfare (leisure or non-
traded sector).9 Thus a country's size is controlled by changing its share of the total world
endowment of labor. Table 1 outlines the overall scope of the numeric model indicating the
equilibrium conditions and associated variables.
We proceed by specifying the conditions outlined in Table 1. For the ¯rst condition note
9In the case with only national di®erentiation, the standard Armington formulation, the economy is fully
specialized, and any level of tari® cannot change domestic production. We introduce the labor-leisure choice
decision in order to avoid this complete specialization and inelasticity of traded output with respect to the
tari®.
8that the unit-expenditure function indicates the marginal cost of a unit of welfare (under
optimal consumption), and the welfare level will satisfy marginal cost equals marginal bene¯t.
Let PAr equal the price of the composite commodity Ar [from equation (2)], and PLr represent
the price of labor, then assuming Cobb-Douglas utility, the equilibrium conditions associated





r ¡ PWr = 0; (5)
where PWr is the true-cost-of-living index (which is the marginal bene¯t of an additional unit
of welfare). The ¯rst term is the Cobb-Douglas unit-expenditure function. The parameter
° indicates the value share of the non-tradable (labor) in welfare.
Associated with optimal activity levels of Ar, the activity which generates the composite
of the traded commodities, are similar conditions that equate marginal cost to marginal
bene¯t. Marginal bene¯t is simply represented by the price of the composite, PAr. The unit
cost of Ar is the dual representation of the technology in (2). The arguments in this cost
function include the domestic Dixit-Stiglitz composite price, given by Pr, and the gross-of-


























¡ PAr = 0: (6)
Formulating monopolistically-competitive production of the Dixit-Stiglitz composite Qr
includes three separate conditions. First there is an industry-wide condition for the Qr






1¡¾f ¡ Pr = 0 (7)
9Equation (7) is simply the dual of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation presented in (1). Second,
¯rm-level output, qr, is determined by the optimal pricing decision (where the demand
elasticity for a small ¯rm is ¾f). Marginal cost is simply the price of labor, PLr, and ¯rms
maximize pro¯ts by pricing according to the familiar markup;
PLr ¡ (1 ¡ 1=¾f)pr = 0 (8)
The third condition is associated with free entry. The number of ¯rms, Nr, is determined by
the condition that entry will adjust such that pro¯ts are zero. Operating pro¯ts cover the





Combining conditions (8) and (9) we can derive the familiar large-group-monopolistic-competition
result that ¯rm-level output is invariant to industry scale. When ¾f is ¯nite the number of
¯rms adjusts to ensure zero pro¯ts.10
With all of the technologies speci¯ed in conditions (5) through (9) we generate the market
equilibrium conditions for each price. Each market-clearance condition sets excess demand
for each commodity to zero. The market equilibrium condition for labor is given by the
exhaustion of the labor endowment, Lr, on direct demand for labor in utility and on demand
for labor in production. Let RAr indicate nominal income in region r then we have the




¡ Nr (fr + qr) = 0: (10)
10As a matter of programming practicality, when ¾f = 1 the index on the number of ¯rms is ¯xed at one
(Nr = 1) and qr is allowed to vary. The level of ¯xed costs, fr, is calibrated based on ¾f and our assumption
of zero pro¯ts in the benchmark equilibrium. When ¾f = 1 there is no markup, and fr = 0.




























Notice that the rather complex export-demand term (the last term) simpli¯es greatly when
the elasticity of substitution between national varieties equals the domestic-import elasticity
(i.e., ¾n = ¾dm).
Associated with the price indexes on the Armington composites, PAr, are the market
equilibrium conditions




The ¯rst term is total supply of the Armington composite and the second is Cobb-Douglas
demand. The ¯nal market clearance condition ensures that the nominal value of welfare
equals the nominal value of representative-agent expenditures, RAr;
PWrWr ¡ RAr = 0 (14)
The variable associated with (14) is the true-cost-of-living index, PWr. Dividing (14) by
PWr yields the standard market balance condition in quantities. We complete the general


















Income equals the value of the labor endowment, where Lr is the endowment quantity, plus
the value of tari® revenues.
Conditions (5) through (15) specify a complete multi-region general equilibrium that
incorporates the generalized demand system illustrated in Figure 1. Only relative prices are
determined, however, so we remove the market clearance condition for labor in the focus
region, H (Home), and declare the associated price as the numeraire (PLH = 1).
3.2 Experimental Parameters and Calibration
Our primary goal is to examine the e®ects of changing the relative elasticities, but we are
also concerned with examining the interaction of these e®ects with changes in the ¯rst-order
calibration. The ¯rst-order calibration is indicated by the CES distribution parameters (¯rs)
and the endowment levels (Lr).11 We introduce the parametric instrument µH to control
relative country sizes. The size of the focus country, indicated by the index H, is directly
controlled by µH as follows:
LH = µHL
W; (16)
where LW = 100 is the (arbitrary) world endowment of labor. For simplicity we assume that
the remaining country's endowment shares are symmetric (µr = µs, for all r and s 6= H),
11The ¯rst-order calibration also depends on the value share of the nontraded sector, °. We do not explore
the models sensitivity to this parameter in this paper. We simply make the assumption that ° = 0:2 in all
of the experiments that follow.
12Table 2: Experimental Parameters for the Illustrative Model
Parameter Description Range
¾f = 1
1¡®f Elasticity of substitution between ¯rm-level varieties 1 < ¾f · 1
¾n Elasticity of substitution between import varieties 0 < ¾n < 1
¾dm Elasticity of substitution between domestic and import varieties 0 < ¾dm < 1
µH Benchmark share of the focus region, H, in world endowments 0 < µH < 1
¸ Home-bias parameter (proportional reduction in benchmark trade) 0 < ¸ < 1
such that the endowment of labor is given by
Lr6=H = L
W 1 ¡ µH
R ¡ 1
; (17)
where R is the total number of regions.
We also introduce the parametric instrument ¸ to control the degree of home bias in
preferences. The index ¸ can vary from zero, indicating no bias toward home varieties, to
one. If ¸ = 1 then domestic agents only have a preference for home varieties and there
is no trade. This parameter is important because it captures a feature found in many
calibrated models. Normally, missing trade is accommodated (in calibrated models) by
introducing a home bias in the calibrated preferences. This stands in contrast to much of
the theoretic and empirical literature, which emphasizes unobserved trade or networking
costs as an important impediment to trade.12 Table 2 summarizes the parameters that are
utilized in our experiments.
Given the parameter values we calibrate the benchmark trade equilibrium by computing
the ¯rs that apply for a given experiment. We ¯rst determine units by normalizing on the
benchmark wage and Armington price indexes ( ¹ PAr = 1, and ¹ PLr = 1) across all regions.
The bar notation indicates the level a variable takes on at the benchmark calibration. We
also normalize the benchmark level of ¯rm output, ¹ qr = 1, so the number of ¯rms and
12Tre°er (1995) highlights the observation of \missing trade" relative to what we might expect. Balistreri
and Hillberry (2004) point out, that most applied general equilibrium models adopt a ¯rst-order calibration
that implicitly skews preferences toward home varieties.













Benchmark ¯rm-level pricing is ¹ pr = 1=®f, and the price of the composite is given directly








We ¯nalize the calibration by calculating the CES weights considering the trade reduction
index (¸). For trade from r to s we have region r's production share (which is the same as






















1 ¡ ¯rr ¹ P 1¡¾dm
r
³P





such that ¹ PAr = 1 is maintained in the case that ¾n 6= ¾dm. The actual computer code used
to calibrate and solve the system is included as an appendix to this paper.
144 Results from the Illustrative Model
The ¯rst experiments that we examine explore the impact of ¯rm-level di®erentiation on the
optimal tari®. Figure 2 shows the welfare curves as we vary the tari® imposed by region H
from -15% to 40% under two scenarios. First we adopt a set of relative elasticities not unlike
those typically adopted in standard Armington applied general equilibrium models. That is,
¾f = +1 and ¾n = ¾dm = 7. In the second case we include ¯rm-level di®erentiation, which
is equal to the level of national di®erentiation (i.e., ¾f = ¾n = ¾dm = 7). In both scenarios
we set the ¯rst-order calibration at the central case, characterized by a relatively small focus
region size (µH = 0:001); no home bias in preferences (¸ = 0); and a labor value share in
welfare of 20% (° = 0:2).13
The curve under an assumption that ¾f = +1 con¯rms the ¯nding of Brown (1987)
that small-country tari®s are large under the typical Armington formulation. The optimal
tari® for this relatively small country is 17%. Because the country is a monopoly supplier of
its export variety the optimal tari® re°ects the optimal markup over marginal cost, approx-
imately 1=(¾n ¡ 1). In contrast when we make an assumption consistent with sub-national
di®erentiation, allocating the market power over exports to ¯rms, the optimal tari® drops
dramatically to less than 1/2% (a ¯ner search reveals the optimal tari® to be about 0.4%).
One signi¯cant contribution of our generalized demand system is that all of the interme-
diate cases are also available. Table 3 presents the computed optimal tari®s under di®erent
assumptions about the level of ¯rm di®erentiation and country size. As one might expect
the optimal tari® increases with both the level of substitution between ¯rm varieties and
the relative country size. For small countries the optimal tari® is critically dependent on
the degree of ¯rm di®erentiation assumed. For a country that has a relative size of 0.1%
13We choose such a small focus region, because we know that in a perfectly competitive model with
homogeneous goods, the optimal tari® would be zero. Thus the tari® we calculate for the Armington
formulation with no sub-national di®erentiation (¾f = +1) is due entirely to national product di®erentiation
and not to country size in Figure 2
15Figure 2: Welfare and tari®s with and without ¯rm di®erentiation (¾n = ¾dm = 7, µH = 0:1%,
¸ = 0, and ° = 0:2)
Table 3: Computed optimal tari®s in percent (¾n = ¾dm = 7, ¸ = 0, and ° = 0:2)
µH (relative country size)
¾f 0.1% 1.6% 3.1% 6.3% 12.5% 25% 50%
3.5 -16 -11 -4 6 13 17 23
7 0 7 10 14 16 19 24
14 9 13 14 16 18 20 25
30 13 15 16 17 18 20 25
100 16 16 17 17 18 20 25
+1 17 17 17 18 19 21 25
16of the world economy the optimal tari® ranges from a -16% to a +17% depending on ¾f.
The negative optimal tari®s found for small countries with more ¯rm di®erentiation than
national di®erentiation (¾f < ¾n) are consistent with Markusen (1990).
We can think of ¯rms as setting export taxes with their markups. In the cell (7, 0.1%),
the optimal tari® is zero because the small ¯rm's markup is aligned with a social planner's
optimal export tax (given that ¾f = ¾dm).14 The ¯rm's market power is based on the
di®erentiation indicated by ¾f, and the (small-country's) social planner's market power is
based on the di®erentiation indicated by ¾dm. When the elasticities are aligned the social
planner is preempted by optimal ¯rm pricing. In the cell (3.5, 0.1%), the export tax set
by each small ¯rm is too high given that ¾dm = 7:0, and thus a negative optimal tari® is
required as an o®setting distortion. This is the intuition about the result that moving down
any column leads to an increase in the optimal tari®.
The intuition about moving across a row (in Table 3) follows from a more traditional
large-country argument for optimal tari®s. Large countries have market power based on the
collective size of their exporting industry on world markets. In the cell (7, 50%) home ¯rms
are optimally exploiting di®erentiation, but are not accounting for the fact that collectively
they are one half of the world market.15 Essentially, within the industry there is an exter-
nality associated with marginal increases in ¯rm pricing, the bene¯ts of which accrue to all
competing ¯rms. If some of these ¯rms are in the home country then, from a home-country
social planner's perspective, ¯rm-level mark ups are too low. This e®ect intensi¯es as we
move across any given row of Table 3. As we move across the row more of the externality
accrues to home ¯rms, and higher optimal tari®s are indicated.
Figure 3 and Table 4 show the same pattern of results when we double the elasticity of
14In the general equilibrium export taxes are equivalent to import tari®s. This is commonly known as
Lerner Symmetry [Lerner (1936)].
15This follows directly from our assumption that ¯rms are small. The ¯rm-level demand function [embed-
ded in equation (11)] is based on each ¯rm holding an approximately zero market share.
17Figure 3: Welfare and tari®s with and without ¯rm di®erentiation (¾n = ¾dm = 14, µH = 0:1%,
¸ = 0, and ° = 0:2)
substitution between national varieties. As mentioned in our introduction one might mitigate
large optimal tari®s in the Armington framework by increasing the Armington elasticity, ¾n.
We show this implication, as the optimal tari® for the small country drops from 17% to
8% when the national-level elasticity is set to 14 rather than 7. The key contribution that
our generalized demand system o®ers, however, is a decoupling of the optimal tari® from
the speci¯c Armington elasticity. For small countries, allocating market power over distinct
varieties to ¯rms rather than countries centers the welfare curves in Figures 2 and 3 over an
approximately zero tari®, regardless of the Armington elasticity. Armington elasticities are
thus free to be set in a way that best re°ects trade responses, and not as a control on the
optimal tari®.
Another interesting result that emerges from our stylized theoretic model is that the
optimal tari® increases as the degree of home bias increases. In Table 5 we hold the size of
18Table 4: Computed optimal tari®s in percent (¾n = ¾dm = 14, ¸ = 0, and ° = 0:2)
µH (relative country size)
¾f 0.1% 1.6% 3.1% 6.3% 12.5% 25% 50%
3.5 -23 -20 -17 -8 10 7 12
7 -7 -3 0 3 6 9 13
14 0 3 5 6 8 10 14
30 4 6 7 8 9 10 14
100 7 7 8 8 9 11 14
+1 8 8 8 8 9 11 14
Table 5: Computed optimal tari®s in percent (¾n = ¾dm = 7, µH = 0:1%, and ° = 0:2)
¸ (trade reduction index)
Higher values indicate
more home bias
¾f 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
3.5 -16 9 12 13 14 14
7 0 14 15 15 16 16
14 9 15 16 16 16 16
30 13 16 16 16 16 16
100 16 17 17 17 17 17
+1 17 17 17 17 17 17
the country to be relatively small, at 0.1% of world income, but increase the value of ¸ from
zero to 0:5. The results in Table 5 show a dramatic increase in the optimal tari® as home
bias increases, even for a relatively small country and regardless of the degree of sub-national
di®erentiation assumed.
To explain the results in Table 5, consider beginning at a symmetric free-trade equilibrium
where domestic and imported varieties are priced the same. Suppose that an import tari®
leaves the total number of varieties unchanged, but leads to a substitution of domestic for
foreign varieties: dNH = ¡
P
r6=H dNr > 0. If there is home bias, this change bene¯ts the
domestic economy more than without, since the shifts are weighted by their utility value
and both varieties (locally) cost the same. Conversely, the rest of the world is hurt more by
this change than without home bias, because their loss of home varieties is valued more than
19the increase in imported varieties. This generalizes to a case where dNH +
P
r6=H dNr < 0
in the relative sense that the welfare increase is greater, or the loss less, when there is home
bias than when there is not. This process is of course bounded: as the tari® increases, each
foreign variety is valued domestically (the domestic demand prices) by more than the cost
of buying it (the pre-tax import prices) and so at some point the loss of a foreign variety is
more welfare-costly than the gain of a domestic variety.
The pattern of results presented in Table 5 is important to the contemporary debate
over unobserved trade costs. Hillberry et al. (2005) indicate that we might not need to
worry about whether a calibrated model accommodates missing trade through taste bias or
through unobserved trade frictions|as long as policy is independent of the unobserved trade
frictions.16 Our analysis suggests that this may hold in the case of perfect competition (the
optimal tari® varies little in the ¯nal row of Table 5), but when sub-national di®erentiation
is considered the degree that the model attributes missing trade to a taste bias a®ects the
optimal tari®.
In turn, this is an important consideration in applied welfare analysis. For example,
the second row of Table 5 shows an optimal tari® of zero if we assume no taste bias but
an optimal tari® of 14% for a modest amount of taste bias. When alternative methods of
calibration (taste bias versus unobserved trade frictions) in°uence the implied optimal tari®,
welfare analysis of policy will be a®ected.
5 Application of the generalized model
To give the generalized model an applied context it is useful to compare it to models that
appear in the literature. To explore the performance of the generalized model we calibrate
16In fact, Hillberry et al. (2005) argue that the strong correlation between observed trade and trade frictions
and the taste-bias parameters is evidence that policy is not independent of unobserved trade frictions and,
therefore, we should be worried about calibrated taste bias.
20a version of it to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) social accounts [Dimaranan
and McDougall (2005)] and conduct a number simulation experiments. The model is coded
in GAMS/MPSGE and is available upon request. Although somewhat muddled by the
complications of real trade patterns, the experiments tend to support our general ¯ndings
(from the relatively transparent model presented above). The incentive for small countries
that trade intensively (those with relatively less home bias in preferences) to unilaterally
impose high rates of protection are reduced when ¯rm-level di®erentiation is considered.
The overall scope of the applied model includes the world general equilibrium in multiple
commodities and regions. Geographically we include four focus countries and the remainder





² Rest of America
² East Asia
² Europe
² Rest of World
The commodities in the model include the following nine aggregates:
² Agriculture
² Coal oil gas and other minerals
² Other processed food and tobacco products
² Textiles apparel and leather products
² Wood products




The model uses this level of aggregation to give an indication of how an applied model might
react, but also maintains a high degree of tractability. Given the methodological nature of
our exercise we simply accept the GTAP data as an accurate representation of the world
social accounts. Furthermore, we make no attempt at estimating actual trade elasticities.
We simply make the following assumptions across each commodity. We set the elasticity of
substitution between import varieties at seven (¾n = 7). Consistent with many applications
21we set the domestic-import elasticity at one half the import-variety elasticity (¾dm = 3:5).
The key experimental control is to vary the ¯rm-level elasticity between seven and in¯nity
(¾f = 7 or ¾f = 1).
We start the analysis by examining the unilateral incentives for countries to impose tari®s
under the alternative assumptions about ¯rm-level di®erentiation. To setup the experiment
we utilize an updated baseline of global free trade. Once the model is calibrated we remove
all trade distortions to generate the benchmark equilibrium. This is important for looking
at unilateral incentives to protect, because the observed rates of protection include product
mix as well as country mix distortions.
With the free-trade benchmark established, we then identify the optimal rate of protection
for a given domestic country under a uniform tari® on all imports of all commodities from
all foreign countries. This will be a relatively e±cient tax mechanism because it tends not to
distort across commodities or source countries. Given this setup one should not be surprised
to see relatively large optimal rates of protection. We warn the reader that these hypothetical
experiments are designed to illustrate our argument, and should not be interpreted as policy
prescriptions.
Actual tari®s on speci¯c products (and possibly on speci¯c products from speci¯c coun-
tries) are ine±cient relative to our experiment because they have an impact on relative prices
in addition to increasing the average price. The relative price changes cause demand sub-
stitutions that are highly distortionary. In contrast, the uniform tari® that we analyze has
relatively minor impacts on relative prices across commodities or on relative prices across
di®erent source regions. The uniform tari® is, therefore, relatively e±cient (compared to the
more common targeted protection observed in the data).
Figure 4 illustrates how Canada's welfare changes with the tari® rate under the alternative
assumptions about ¯rm-level di®erentiation. Relative to the global-free-trade benchmark a
typical Armington model indicates that Canada's optimal uniform tari® would be 18% on all
22Figure 4: Canadian welfare under a uniform tari® relative to global free trade
imports. In contrast, if we assume that ¯rm varieties are also di®erentiated the optimal tari®
is cut in half. Unlike the theoretic model presented above, however, we do not see a (nearly)
complete elimination of the optimal tari®. We suggest that this is due to the presence of
a home bias in the calibrated model. Considering Table 5 we can see that inserting even
a modest amount of home bias in preferences escalates the optimal tari® (even when we
assume a high degree of ¯rm di®erentiation). So, although muted, we ¯nd general support
for our hypothesis that ¯rm di®erentiation is important when we examine Canada's unilateral
incentives.
We ¯nd less evidence of a zero optimal tari® for Chile. Figure 5 plots the welfare curves
for Chile. Under no ¯rm di®erentiation the optimal tari® for Chile is 16%, and this falls to
11% under ¯rm di®erentiation that is equal to the level of national di®erentiation. Again,
this points to the larger issue of home bias. If there are large networking costs, or other
23Figure 5: Chilean welfare under a uniform tari® relative to global free trade
unobserved costs which restrict trade, and simulation models accommodate the observed
trade °ows by asserting a preference for the home variety, then the simulation models are
likely to exhibit sizable optimal tari®s even for small countries, and even when we consider
¯rm di®erentiation.
Given the results presented in Section 4 and knowledge of how simulation models ac-
commodate the trade pattern, it is not surprising that the reduction of the optimal tari® is
larger for Canada than it is for Chile. Canada is relatively trade intensive and less remote
than Chile. Lessons from the gravity literature (in international trade) suggest that more
unobserved trade costs will be associated with more remote regions. The calibrated model
will systematically impose more home bias on average to those countries that are more re-
mote. The results for Australia are similar to those for Chile, which generally support the
argument that home bias is important.
24Figure 6: U.S. welfare under a uniform tari® relative to global free trade
It is also useful to examine the results for the U.S. The relative size of the U.S. economy
and the U.S. presence in world markets indicate that the optimal uniform tari® must be
relatively high. Figure 6 plots the welfare curves for the U.S. For the U.S. the optimal
rate of protection is relatively insensitive to our assumption about ¯rm di®erentiation. This
is consistent with the analysis in Section 4 (Table 3), where we showed that traditional
large country e®ects dominate the ¯rm di®erentiation e®ect at relatively modest shares of
world income. The optimal tari® for the U.S. falls from 20% under the standard Armington
formulation to 18% when we consider ¯rm di®erentiation. This is roughly in the range of
the results presented in Table 3 for an economy the size of the U.S.
To summarize our unilateral policy experiments, we ¯nd consistently smaller optimal
tari®s when ¯rm di®erentiation is included. This supports our overall hypothesis that ¯rm
di®erentiation is important. We also ¯nd, however, that in the applied model the reduction in
25optimal tari®s is not as dramatic as in our purely theoretic experiments. We suggest that this
is due to the tendency for simulation models to accommodate a lack of trade to home bias.
We ¯nd evidence that remoteness, which is correlated with home bias in calibrated models
[Hillberry et al. (2005)], tends to reduce the impact of adding ¯rm-level di®erentiation.
One additional point deserves mentioning in the context of our unilateral experiments.
Notice that for each focus country that imposes a positive tari® over the relevant range,
the welfare curve under no di®erentiation lies everywhere above the welfare curve assuming
¯rm-level di®erentiation. This indicates that there is more to lose by reducing tari®s (below
the optimal) when we ignore ¯rm-level di®erentiation. Again this strongly supports our
argument that traditional methods might understate the value of liberalization, if in fact
¯rm varieties are important.
In addition to looking at hypothetical unilateral experiments we utilize the calibrated
applied model to examine the removal of tari®s between the US and Australia. This allows
us to examine the model's performance relative to applied applications that appear in the
literature. We compare our results to a number of studies that have examined the likely
impacts of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement. Table 6 presents the results from four
di®erent parameterizations of our calibrated model, and selected results from three studies
that appear in the literature.
The ¯rst scenario, ARM 7, is intended to give a close comparison of the pilot model
to the United States International Trade Commission (2004) analysis of the US-Australia
Free Trade Agreement. Aggregate results from the USITC study are reported under the
column heading USITC 9090 in Table 6. In the scenario ARM 7 the pilot model adopts
a national-level elasticity of substitution of 7 across all sectors and an in¯nite sub-national
elasticity (equivalent to sub-national perfect competition). This is roughly consistent with
the Armington formulation of the USITC's 9090 model.17 Thus, the model gives roughly
17There are a number of di®erences between the pilot calibration and simulations that we perform here
26Table 6: Simulating the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement
Calibrated Pilot Model
ARM 7 MC 7 ARM 30 MC 30 Literature Estimates
¾f =+1 ¾f =7 ¾f =+1 ¾f =30
¾n=7 ¾n=7 ¾n=30 ¾n=30 USITC
¾dm=3:5 ¾dm=3:5 ¾dm=15 ¾dm=15 9090 CIE BKS
Change in US
Welfare ($M) 885 629 972 1,549 491 1,231 19,400
Change in US
Total Imports
($M) 1,852 1,777 21,482 24,630 1,161 NA NA
Change in US
Exports to
Australia ($M) 2,959 3,005 29,790 31,724 2,539 NA NA
Change in US
Imports from
Australia ($M) 2,769 2,954 32,017 44,356 1,759 NA NA
consistent results. The change in US welfare and change in US imports from Australia are
lower in the 9090 study but this might be attributed to exceptions in the actual agreement
that are considered in the USITC analysis, but not in our scenario. We simply remove all
tari®s as measured in the GTAP data.
In the next scenario, MC 7, the model is parameterized with a national and subnational
(¯rm-level) elasticity of substitution of 7. Adding sub-national monopolistic competition
slightly reduces the US bene¯ts from the FTA and slightly changes the aggregate trade
°ows. The loss in US welfare might be attributed to a reduction in foreign varieties that is
and the model implemented by the United States International Trade Commission (2004). Most notably,
our model simply adopts a single national-level elasticity across sectors. A national level elasticity of 7 is
roughly consistent with the average of the commodity speci¯c elasticities used by the USITC. Furthermore,
our model takes the GTAP data and benchmark distortions at face value, where as the USITC 9090 model
adds signi¯cant corrections and modi¯cations. The data aggregations and scenario shocks also di®er between
the pilot and USITC models. To facilitate rapid diagnostics our model is more aggregated. The scenario
examined in the pilot model is a complete liberalization of tari®s between the US and Australia. The USITC
scenario includes detailed exceptions that were a part of the actual agreement. The simpli¯cations made to
the pilot model were made to facilitate a timely comparison and we would advise a more careful consideration
of the real world in any actual simulation. That said, we feel that the results from our model are su±ciently
close to the USITC's results to make a legitimate and useful comparison.
27not o®set by increases in US or Australian varieties (in contrast Australian welfare impacts
increase in the MC 7 case relative to the ARM 7 case).
The next two scenarios, ARM 30 and MC 30, indicate how the pilot model responds when
the national elasticity of substitution is 30 and the sub-national elasticities are respectively
in¯nite and 30. These scenarios illustrate the problematic nature of mitigating high optimal
tari®s through elasticity increases. These scenarios have similar relative results, but larger
welfare bene¯ts and extremely large trade responses. Depending on whether we look at
imports or exports, the ARM 7 and MC 7 scenarios generate bilateral trade responses in
the range of 19% to 26%. In contrast, moving these elasticities up to 30 generates trade
responses in the range of 188% to 390% of base °ows|an order of magnitude higher.
In Table 6, we also include the aggregate welfare results used by the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission (2004) to compare their model with other estimates. The column
titled CIE includes the welfare calculation made by the USITC based on the Berkelmans et
al. (2001) study for the Center for International Economics, and the column titled BKS is
the welfare estimate made by Brown et al. (2004). It is notable that although our model
adopts a monopolistic competition structure it does not come close to replicating the welfare
impacts reported by Brown et al. (2004). As noted in the USITC study, the Brown et al.
(2004) welfare results are substantial at 85% of their reported base trade volumes with the
US.18 One reason that the results of Brown et al. (2004) are larger is because they assume
substantial benchmark distortions in service sectors, which vanish as a result of the FTA.
We view our demonstration of the U.S.-Australia liberalization using our generalized
model as encouraging and useful. Our model generates results in the range of most standard
models, but accommodates monopolistic competition elements that may be important to the
measurement of potential gains from liberalization. The model o®ers a way of accommodat-
18Trade volume is measured as the sum of US imports from Australia plus the sum of US exports to
Australia.
28ing the gains associated with scale and variety e®ects without exaggerating trade responses.
The model is demonstrated to be tractable in a real policy context and allows the user the
°exibility to choose any level of national and sub-national di®erentiation.
6 Conclusion
Reconciling observed intra-industry trade with policy simulation models often involves adopt-
ing an assumption of product di®erentiation. Most applications assume national-level dif-
ferentiation with perfect sub-national competition, or alternatively, ¯rm-level monopolistic
competition and no distinction between national varieties. It is well known that these dif-
ferent structures produce di®erent implied optimal tari®s. This, along with industry scale
e®ects, means that the di®erent structures generate di®erent simulated impacts from liber-
alization. Accurate policy simulation seems to dictate a careful examination of the actual
industrial organization. Ideally, with unlimited resources and time, one might develop the
right structure for each industry and product.
Unfortunately, policy relevance also dictates a timely response with relatively transparent
economy-wide results. Parsimony in modeling is the rule. Following the critique of Brown
(1987), we caution that assuming di®erentiated national products, although convenient, can
lead to signi¯cant implications for the welfare analysis of commercial policy. In particular,
we highlight the implicit allocation of market power over distinct varieties to policy makers
and away from ¯rms. This is troubling in that, traditionally, economists assume that the
agents involved in the actual transactions (exporting ¯rms in this case) extract the rents.
To show the importance of the implicit allocation of market power we develop a general-
ized model that parametrically accommodates both national and ¯rm-level di®erentiation.
Firm-level di®erentiation is accommodated via a standard model of monopolistic compe-
tition. The model is parsimonious but controls the degree of market power allocated to
29countries, versus ¯rms, on a continuum. Our theoretic exploration of this new model is lim-
ited, but we have developed some interesting results, which are important for contemporary
research.
Most importantly we show that the optimal tari® falls when we make parametric as-
sumptions that allocate market power to ¯rms rather than countries. This is important be-
cause it indicates that many contemporary studies that adopt national di®erentiation, with
sub-national perfect competition, might understate the true bene¯ts of liberalization. Fur-
thermore, we show that accommodating the trade pattern by calibrating the CES preference
parameters can exacerbate the problem even when sub-national di®erentiation is consid-
ered. Home bias in preferences implicitly favors home varieties and, again, moves us towards
relatively higher optimal tari®s. As an alternative to preference biases, the theoretic and
econometric literatures emphasize unobserved trade costs in their explanation of the trade
pattern. Policy simulation models may, again, understate the true bene¯ts of liberalization,
because they calibrate in a way that implicitly indicates high optimal tari®s.
In an empirical context we highlight that the optimal tari® is most sensitive to our
assumptions about ¯rm-level di®erentiation for small countries and when there is relatively
little home bias in the pattern of trade. We also demonstrate the generalized demand system
in a pilot applied general equilibrium simulation of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement.
Moving the research forward, the theoretic implications of our generalized demand system
deserve a closer examination. Through this examination we hope to highlight the important
role of the ¯rm in optimally pricing varieties on international markets.
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A Appendix: Illustrative Model Code (GAMS soft-
ware)
1 $title multi-region trade maquette with monopolistic competition
2
3 * Edward J. Balistreri, Colorado School of Mines
4 * James R. Markusen, University of Colorado--Boulder
5 * April, 2007
6
7 $eolcom !
8 * Read in the command line inputs:
9 $if not setglobal theta $setglobal theta 0.001
10 $if not setglobal sig_n $setglobal sig_n 7
11 $if not setglobal sig_dm $setglobal sig_dm 7
12 $if not setglobal sig_f $setglobal sig_f 14
13 $if not setglobal lam $setglobal lam 0
14 $if not setglobal gam $setglobal gam 0.2
15 $if not setglobal hg $setglobal hg no
16
17 set r regions /
18 h ! home (focus) region
19 f1 ! foreign region 1






26 theta share of world endowment allocated to h,
27 sig_n elasticity of substitution between national varieties,
28 sig_dm elasticity of substitution between domestic and imports,
29 sig_f elasticity of substitution between firm-level varieties
30 lam home bias parameter (proportional decrease in trade volume)
31 gam share of economy that is not x sector
32 hg switch for trade in homogeneous good
33 e(r) value of benchmark traded goods by region
3234 h(r) value of benchmark leisure by region
35 beta(s,r) benchmark CES distribution
36 vshr(r) value share;
37
38 * Assign values for the sensitivity parameters.
39 theta = %theta%;
40 sig_n = %sig_n%;
41 sig_dm = %sig_dm%;
42 sig_f = %sig_f%;
43 lam = %lam%;
44 gam = %gam%;
45 hg = %hg%;
46
47 * Calculate e(r) based on the leisure to income
48 * share and symmetric foreign countries. Nominal
49 * world income is normalized to 100 at the benchmark.
50 e("h") =100*(1-gam)*theta;
51 e(r)$(ord(r) gt 1)=100*(1-gam)*(1-theta)/(card(r)-1);
52 h(r) =e(r)*(gam/(1-gam));
53
54 * Declare the policy instrument
55 parameter
56 tar home country tariff rate /0.0/;
57
58 * Reference values
59 parameter
60 pf0 benchmark firm price
61 px0 benchmark price of the composite
62 x0 benchmark composite quantity
63 f0(r) calibrated fixed cost
64 pa0 benchmark price of the composite
65 a0(r) benchmark armington activity level
66 pw0(r) benchmark cost of living index
67 w0(r) benchmark utility
68 betaM(r) import weight in armington technology;
69
70 pf0(r) = sig_f/(sig_f-1);









80 * Calculate the CES distribution parameters (pa=1):
81 vshr(r)=e(r)/sum(t,e(t));
82 beta(r,s) = (1-lam)*vshr(r)/((px0(r))**(1-sig_n));












95 a0(r) = e(r)/pa0(r);
96 pw0(r) = pa0(r)**(1-gam);
97 w0(r) = (e(r)*(1/(1-gam)))/pw0(r);
98
99 positive variables
100 x(r) quant index on dix-stig composite
101 xf(r) quantity index on aggregate output from firms
102 n(r) number of firms index
103 a(r) armington activity
104 w(r) welfare
105
106 px(r) price index on dixit-stiglitz composite from r
107 pf(r) price of a representative firm variety from r
108 pa(r) price index on armington composite
109 pw(r) true-cost-of-living index
110 pl(r) price index on labor
111 py price index on homogeneous factor
112
113 ra(r) nominal income;
114
115 equations
116 prf_x(r) optimal dixit-stiglitz activity level
117 prf_xf(r) profit maximization (mc=mr)
118 prf_n(r) free entry condition (tr=tc)
119 prf_a(r) optimal armington activity level
120 prf_w(r) optimal consumption
121
122 mkt_px(r) mkt clearance for dixit-stiglitz composite
123 mkt_pf(r) mkt clearance for firm output
124 mkt_pa(r) mkt clearance for armington aggregate
125 mkt_pw(r) mkt clearance for utils
126 mkt_pl(r) mkt clearance for labor
127 mkt_py mkt clearance for homogeneous factor
128




133 + pf(r)$(not 1/sig_f)- px(r) =g= 0;
134
135 prf_xf(r)..
34136 pl(r)$(not hg)+py$hg - pf(r)*(1-1/sig_f) =g= 0;
137
138 prf_n(r)..









148 (px(s)*(1+tar$(ord(r) eq 1)))**(1-sig_n)
149 )**((1-sig_dm)/(1-sig_n)))
150 )**(1/(1-sig_dm))












163 beta(t,s)*((1+tar$(ord(s) eq 1))*PX(t))**(1-sig_n))
164 **((sig_n-sig_dm)/(1-sig_n)))*
165 beta(r,s)*((1+tar$(ord(s) eq 1))*PX(r))**(-sig_n)
166 ) =g= 0;
167
168 mkt_pa(r)..








177 -gam*RA(r)/pl(r)-n(r)*(f0(r) + xf(r)))$(not hg)





183 +(-py)$(not hg)=g= 0;
184
185 mkt_pw(r)..













199 )$(ord(r) eq 1);
200
201 model mrtmc_mcp /
202 prf_x.x, prf_a.a, prf_w.w,prf_xf.xf,prf_n.n,










213 * Set the numeraire depending on homogeneous traded good
214 pl.fx("h")$(not hg)=1;py.fx$hg=1;
215
216 * Set the level values to zero for unused variables




221 * Check the benchmark replication at (iterlim=0)
222 mrtmc_mcp.iterlim=0;
223 solve mrtmc_mcp using mcp;
224
225 abort$(mrtmc_mcp.objval > 1e-5) "mcp benchmark is not balanced";
36